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Containing Systemic Risk:  
New Developments in Trans-Atlantic  
Hedge Fund Regulation 
MICHAEL MCDONALD∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Operating as part of the so-called “shadow banking system,”1 
hedge funds have evolved to become titans of the modern global 
financial industry. Not only do hedge funds attract some of the brightest 
minds in finance and often provide historically superior returns to their 
investors, but their enormous size can also provide them with 
tremendous influence over the course of global financial markets. 
Today, however, the familiar regulatory environment in which fund 
managers have traditionally operated is in the process of unprecedented 
change. The severity of the 2008 credit crisis and its aftermath have 
forced market regulators on both sides of the Atlantic to address the 
failures associated with existing regulatory standards, identify new 
regulatory goals, and adjust international standards accordingly. Despite 
the prevailing view that hedge funds played only a marginal role in 
facilitating the onset of the crisis, the industry’s enormous size has 
made it too hard for policymakers to ignore.2 As a result, there has been 
a renewed emphasis on removing the “cloak of secrecy” that has often 
surrounded hedge fund activity.3  
 
∗ J.D., Loyola Law School, 2011; B.A., University of California, Los Angeles. I would like to 
express my sincerest gratitude to all of the editors and staffers of the Loyola of Los Angeles 
International and Comparative Law Review for all of their dedication, diligence, and patience in 
helping publish this Note. 
 1. See ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., SHADOW BANKING, Staff 
Rep. No. 458, at 13 (2010), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf. 
 2. Adam Smith, Should Hedge Funds Face Harsher Regulation?, TIME, July 8, 2010, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1909026,00.html. 
 3. Bigger, Safer but Duller: A Secretive Industry Opens Up to Meet the Demands of 
Investors and Regulators, ECONOMIST, Aug. 26, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com 
/node/16891973/print [hereinafter Bigger, Safer but Duller].  
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In the United States and the European Union (EU), this trend was 
initially predicated upon the desire to achieve regulatory 
“harmonization” to prevent the harmful effects of regulatory arbitrage.4 
This process, however, has proven difficult in light of each region’s 
individual assessment of the appropriate balance between the promotion 
of resilient and sustainable markets with that of economic growth and 
innovation.5 For this reason, many commentators have argued 
throughout this process that the two regions have actually taken 
divergent paths.6 
This Note will explore the question of whether the United States 
and the EU have achieved their respective goals of establishing an 
effective, unified body of financial reform measures that address hedge 
fund activity and its broad impact on the financial markets. In particular, 
this analysis will focus on these measures as they address the primary 
concerns regarding the relationship between hedge funds and the build-
up of systemic risk within the financial system. Part II begins with a 
review of some of the basic characteristics that distinguish hedge funds 
from other types of investment vehicles and will consider the following 
areas:  the structure of hedge funds, fund investment strategies, and fund 
investor pools. Part III will then identify the ways in which large hedge 
funds can present a systemic threat to stability of the international 
financial system as a whole.  
Part IV will undertake a comparative analysis of both the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank”) in the United States and the recent agreement on the Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers Directive in the EU (“AIFMD”). This will 
be accomplished by comparing the following areas:  1) the aims and 
background of each set of reforms; and 2) how these approaches address 
the regulatory concerns over systemic risk and, by extension, the 
suitability of these approaches in light of the unique challenges that 
 
 4. Andreas Engert, Transnational Hedge Fund Regulation, 11 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 
277, 362 (2010), available at 
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=7923084&jid=EBR&volumeId
=11&issueId=03&aid=7923083 (“Regulatory arbitrage describes how participants in the hedge 
fund industry react to regulation if they perceive it as costly.”). 
 5. Anthony Faiola & Brady Dennis, U.S., Europe Fall out of Step on Global Financial 
Reform, WASH. POST., May 26, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/05/25/AR2010052505316.html.  
 6. Id.; see Oxford Analytica, E.U., U.S. Investing Regulations Diverge, FORBES.COM, 
(Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/2010/08/05/united-states-european-union-investment-
business-oxford.html; see also Martin Arnold, Brooke Masters & Nikki Tait, Investing:  
Alternative Visions, FIN. TIMES (May 13, 2010), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f93da592-5ec4-
11df-af86-00144feab49a.html#axzz1yGyCFepS [hereinafter Investing: Alternative Visions]. 
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regulation of this area entail. Ultimately, this Note takes the position 
that although there remain some areas of divergence, the financial 
reforms adopted by the United States and the EU essentially converge 
and represent modest, yet realistic standards for mitigating the 
industry’s potential to inflict harmful externalities on the financial 
system. 
II.  WHAT IS A HEDGE FUND? AN “INDUSTRY” TERM 
Despite its prevalence, a commonly accepted definition of a 
“hedge fund” does not exist.7 Instead, hedge funds are often 
characterized by what they are not.  In the United States, for example, 
hedge funds have been defined to the extent by which they fall under an 
exception to the federal securities laws.  Before the Dodd-Frank Act, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) defined a hedge fund as 
“an entity that holds a pool of securities and perhaps other assets, whose 
interests are not sold in a registered public offering and which is not 
registered as an investment company under the Investment Company 
Act.”8 Similarly, the EU has simply categorized hedge funds as 
“alternative investments” that do not require authorization as 
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities 
(UCITS) under Article 5 of Directive 2009/65/EC.9 While these narrow 
definitions may serve legislative purposes, they fail to capture both the 
structure and complexity of fund investment activities and are, 
therefore, of limited use.  For these reasons, the definition of a hedge 
fund as an “industry” term is more instructive.10 According to this 
classification, the term “hedge fund” encompasses the three 
fundamental components inherent in most hedge funds:  their legal 
organization, investment strategy, and investor profiles.11 
 
 7. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS: STAFF 
REPORT TO THE U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 3 (2003) [hereinafter IMPLICATIONS], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf.   
 8. George Sami, A Comparative Analysis of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States 
and Europe, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 275, 277 (2009). 
 9. Press Release, European Council, Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers 
(“AIFMD”): Frequently Asked Questions (Nov. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Frequently Asked 
Questions], available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/572&type=HTML.   
 10.  Michael J. Schmidt, Investor Protection in Europe and the United States: Impacting the 
Future of Hedge Funds, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 161, 162 (2007). 
 11. Id.; see also Sargon Daniel, Yesterday’s Regulatory Schemes for Today’s Investment 
Vehicles, 27 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 247, 251 (2007).  
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A.  Hedge Fund Structure 
A hedge fund is a pool of assets collected from both institutional 
and accredited investors that is administered by a fund manager.12 In 
return for their investment into the fund, investors receive a share of the 
pooled assets and, by extension, the fund’s profits.13 Today, almost all 
hedge funds in the United States and the EU are organized as limited 
liability corporations or limited partnerships.14 This structure provides 
hedge fund managers with the ability to maintain a high level of control 
over the fund’s investment strategy and minimize tax-exposure, while 
also allowing them to invest their own money into the fund.15 The 
majority of hedge fund entities are set up in the Cayman Islands to take 
advantage of the country’s favorable tax incentives.16 Most funds, 
however, are “managed” in the United States, followed by the United 
Kingdom,17 and increasingly, Singapore and Hong Kong.18 
B.  Hedge Fund Investment Strategies 
As the name suggests, fund managers often “hedge” against the 
inherent risks associated with their investments using a variety of 
techniques. A “hedge” essentially involves taking an investment 
position in a security while, at the same time, offsetting that position 
with another investment.19 This can be done using both long and short 
investment strategies.20 Although hedging is a method designed to 
 
 12. Engert, supra note 4, at 333. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 355. 
 15. Id. See also Dustin G. Hall, The Elephant in the Room: Dangers of Hedge Funds in Our 
Financial Markets, 60 FLA. L. REV. 183, 188 (2008). 
 16. Lartease Tiffith, Hedge Fund Regulation: What the FSA Is Doing Right and Why the 
SEC Should Follow the FSA’s Lead, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 497, 500 (2007).    
 17. See Schmidt, supra note 10, at 162. Specifically, forty out of the fifty largest European 
hedge funds are currently headquartered in the United Kingdom. See Bill McIntosh, Europe 
50: Europe’s Largest Single Managers Ranked by AUM, HEDGE FUND J. (Sept. 2010), 
http://www.thehedgefundjournal.com/magazine/201009/research/the-europe-50-2010-.php 
[hereinafter Europe 50]. 
 18. See Netty Ismail, Singapore’s New Hedge-Fund Regulation Puts City ‘Back on Map,’ 
BLOOMBERG (July 28, 2010, 9:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-28/singapore-
hedge-fund-regulations-lure-managers-put-city-back-on-the-map-.html; Saeed Azhar & Parvathy 
Ullatil, Seeking Less Scrutiny, Hedge Funds Flock to Asia, REUTERS (May 17, 2010), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/17/us-asia-hedgefunds-analysis-
idUSTRE64G31W20100517. 
 19. Jennifer Ralph Oppold, The Changing Landscape of Hedge Fund Regulation: Current 
Concerns and a Principle-Based Approach, 10 U. PA. J. BUS, & EMP. L. 833, 834 (2008). 
 20. A commonly used practice, short selling, is a procedure in which the fund manager will 
“borrow” a security from a lender and bet that the value of the security will decline. Upon doing 
so, the manager will then sell the security and buy back the lower priced security and return it to 
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minimize investment risk, investing in hedge funds can actually entail a 
higher degree of risk compared with other forms of investment, such as 
mutual funds, because of their tendency to pursue a more aggressive 
investment strategy.21 This is due, in large part, to the fact that hedge 
fund managers seek to maximize absolute return to their investors rather 
than measure fund performance relative to a designated financial 
benchmark or index.22 In doing so, many fund managers utilize highly 
complex, proprietary investment strategies that typically incorporate a 
variety of asset classes.23 Depending on the type of fund, these asset 
classes often involve the use of complex financial instruments in the 
form of options, derivatives, and leverage.24  
Regardless of the fund’s investment philosophy, fund managers 
may also incorporate the use of economic leverage into their investment 
strategy. Defined as the practice of purchasing “stocks or other 
investments by using borrowed funds (on margin),” leverage can assist 
certain funds in providing the highest possible rate of return to its 
investors.25 Typically, hedge funds obtain financial leverage through the 
use of repurchase agreements, short positions, and derivatives.26 While 
not all hedge funds use leverage, the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) has found that hedge funds “account for more than 40% 
of the trading volume in the U.S. leverage loan market” and more than 
85% of the distressed debt market.27 
Overall, hedge funds pursue a wide-range of investment strategies 
that cover essentially every corner of the financial market. Not 
surprisingly, direct regulation of fund manager activity is thus 
exceedingly difficult because of the diverse nature of fund activities and 
 
the lender. If timed correctly, the fund manager will have captured the “spread” between the value 
of the security at the time that it was sold and the value at the time that it was repurchased and 
replaced. Although politically unpopular, particularly in Europe, short selling can play a 
beneficial role in facilitating market rationalization and market liquidity. Daniel, supra note 11, at 
252. 
 21. See Tamar Frankel, Private Investment Funds: Hedge Funds’ Regulation by Size, 39 
RUTGERS L.J. 657, 665 (2008). 
 22. IMPLICATIONS, supra note 7, at viii. 
 23. See Matthew Goldstein, A Secret Society: Hedge Funds and Their Mysterious Success, 6 
J. INT’L BUS. & L. 111, 114 (2007).  
 24. See Schmidt, supra note 10, at 163. 
 25. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD FINANCE AND INVESTMENT DICTIONARY 194 (1st ed. 2003). 
 26. HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL 
MANAGEMENT, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, 4–5 
(Apr. 1999), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/hedgfund.pdf. 
 27. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-200, HEDGE FUNDS: REGULATORS 
AND MARKET PARTICIPANTS ARE TAKING STEPS TO STRENGTHEN MARKET DISCIPLINE, BUT 
CONTINUED ATTENTION IS NEEDED 1 (2008) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08200.pdf. 
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the ways in which their strategies straddle the boundaries of both 
regulated and un-regulated market activities.  
C.  Hedge Fund Investors and Fees 
Due to the risks often associated with a more aggressive 
investment strategy, hedge funds have traditionally been the exclusive 
domain of high net-worth and institutional investors.28  In both the 
United States and the EU, hedge funds are prohibited from soliciting 
investments from the general public, and instead must raise capital from 
private accredited investors via private placement offerings.29 In order to 
invest in a hedge fund in the United States, for example, the investor 
must be an “accredited investor,” which requires an individual or joint-
spouse net-worth of one million dollars.30 Similarly, EU investors must 
meet the criteria of a “professional investor.”31 These entry barriers are 
comparatively high because these investors should possess a higher 
degree of financial sophistication and are therefore better able to 
withstand the elevated risk associated with a more aggressive 
investment strategy.32  
In addition to these statutory requirements, most hedge funds also 
maintain a minimum investment threshold of at least one million dollars 
and include certain time frames in which investors may not withdraw 
their money from the fund.33 Today, however, institutional investors 
such as pension funds and insurance companies are also heavily 
invested in the hedge fund market—thereby allowing non-qualifying 
investors to participate through the back door.34 
 
 28. However, the recent trend is for institutional investors rather than the high net-worth, 
“professional” investors to dominate hedge fund investor pools. See Schmidt, supra note 10, at 
163; see also John Horsfield-Bradbury, Hedge Fund Self-Regulation in the U.S. and the UK 8 
(Harvard Law Sch. Victor Brudney Prize in Corporate Governance Paper, 2008), available at 
http://law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_centr/corporate_governance/papers/Brudney2008_Horsfield
-Bradbury.pdf. 
 29. Alex Hood, Developments in Banking and Financial Law: 2008–2009, 28 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 61, 63 (2009). 
 30. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5) (West 2011). 
 31. See Council Directive 2011/61, arts. 31(6), 32(9), 35(17), 39(11), 40(17), 2011 O.J. 
(L/174) 1 (EU).  
 32. See Schmidt, supra note 10, at 163, 166–67. 
 33. Matthew Lewis, A Transatlantic Dilemma: A Comparative Review of American and 
British Hedge Fund Regulation, 22 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 347, 359 (2008). From a regulatory 
standpoint, these traditional entry barriers are commonly referred to as the “indirect regulation 
approach.” See also Schmidt, supra note 10, at 166–67. 
 34. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, AGREEMENT AMONG PWG AND U.S. AGENCY 
PRINCIPALS ON PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES REGARDING PRIVATE POOLS OF CAPITAL § 5 
(2007), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/hp272_principles.pdf 
[hereinafter PWG AGREEMENT]. 
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In addition to entry barriers, the fee structure common to most 
hedge funds provides yet another important mechanism that limits the 
pool of fund investors. As one might expect, investing in a hedge fund 
is expensive. Typical fees include a charge of 1–3% of the assets under 
management, assessed on behalf of the fund advisor, as well as an 
additional charge of 10–30% of the fund’s yearly appreciation in 
value.35 These fee arrangements are based on the absolute performance 
of the fund, which can potentially result in a very high level of 
compensation for fund managers.36 Accordingly, these fee structures can 
incentivize excessive risk taking.37 Through these highly lucrative fee 
arrangements, hedge fund managers have become some of the highest 
compensated figures in the world. For example, John Paulson, advisor 
to the Paulson and Co. hedge fund, made a record four billion dollars in 
2008 in personal compensation from fees stemming from a single 
trade.38 
III.  HEDGE FUNDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK 
The term “systemic risk” can be roughly defined as the risk 
attributable to a certain market participant or segment and its 
corresponding negative-potential impact on another market participant, 
segment, or economy as a whole.39 Correspondingly, a “systemic event” 
is defined as an event where “shocks to one part of the financial system 
lead to shocks elsewhere, impinging on the stability of the real 
economy.”40 These “shocks” can lead to the reduction, if not 
elimination, of capital market flows and liquidity needed to run 
everyday business activity.41 Systemic risk is particularly problematic 
because individual investors and firms cannot “protect themselves at 
reasonable cost as long as they participate, directly or indirectly, in the 
financial markets.”42 
 The near-collapse of the first major hedge fund, Long Term 
 
 35. Oppold, supra note 19 at 837. 
 36. See John Kambhu et al., Hedge Funds, Financial Intermediation, and Systemic Risk, 13 
ECON. POL’Y REV. 1, 3 (2007).  
 37. Id. at 4. 
 38. GREGORY ZUCKERMAN, THE GREATEST TRADE EVER: THE BEHIND-THE-SCENES 
STORY OF HOW JOHN PAULSON DEFIED WALL STREET AND MADE FINANCIAL HISTORY 254 
(2009). 
 39. See Kambhu et al., supra note 36, at 5–6. 
 40. Id. at 5 (citing Michael D. Bordo, et al, Real Versus Pseudo-International Systemic Risk: 
Some Lessons from History (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 5371, 
1995). 
 41. Engert, supra note 4, at 342. 
 42. See id. at 339. 
  
244 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 34:237 
Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998, provides a prime example of the 
systemic problems that can result from the failure of a large hedge 
fund.43 In the exceptional case of LTCM, a combination of high-amount 
leverage and market volatility prompted investors and counterparties 
alike to liquidate their holdings in the fund to the point that LTCM 
could not cover its liabilities and the Federal Reserve and other private 
banks had to bail out LTCM.44 In the United States, the severity of the 
LTCM collapse prompted the first major debate concerning the need for 
greater oversight over hedge fund activity and led to the creation of the 
President’s Working Group (PWG) to study the impact of the hedge 
fund industry on financial markets.45 In the wake of the most recent 
crisis, the desire to mitigate the systemic risk associated with massive 
pools of lightly regulated capital has been the overriding justification 
for subjecting hedge funds to a higher level of regulatory scrutiny.46  
So how does a hedge fund present a systemic risk to the “real 
economy?” Generally, hedge funds can pose a systemic risk to the 
stability of the financial system in two fundamental ways:  1) the 
potential for counterparties to sustain extensive losses in the event of a 
hedge fund failure; and, 2) the potential for disorderly market pricing in 
the event that a large hedge fund rapidly unwinds its investment 
positions.47 
A.  The Limits of Market Discipline:  Hedge Funds  
and Counterparty Exposure 
Because hedge funds invest in a wide array of financial 
instruments, often with the use of significant amounts of leverage, 
losses—like gains—are accordingly amplified.48 In 2007, for example, 
 
 43. See Goldstein, supra note 23, at 118 (“LTCM’s loss resulted from using borrowed 
money to purchase about $120 billion of its estimated $125 billion in assets . . . .”).  
 44.   Id.; see also Private-Sector Refinancing of the Large Hedge Fund, Long-Term Capital 
Management: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 105th Cong. 3–6 (1998) 
(testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/1998/19981001.htm. 
     45.    Id. at 5; see also Chairman of the High-Level Grp. on Fin. Supervision in the EU, The 
High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU: Report (Feb. 25, 2009), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf (similarly, in the 
aftermath of the credit crisis, the EU created the so-called “High Level Group on Financial 
Supervision” (“Larosière Report”) which recommended that hedge funds be required to disclose 
their strategies, use of leverage, and their “worldwide activities.”). 
 46. See EU Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 9, at 1 (“Given the global nature of their 
activities, many risks posed by the AIFM have an important cross-border dimension.”). 
 47. See Kambhu et al., supra note 36, at 7–8.  
 48. Timothy Geithner, President, Fed. Reserve Bank, Address at the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority:  Hedge Funds and Derivatives and Their Implications for the Financial System (Sept. 
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the average leverage ratio for the hedge fund industry as a whole was 
1.7 times the value of the fund’s underlying assets.49 By utilizing 
economic leverage, hedge funds typically maintain relationships with a 
number of other financial institutions (“counterparties”) that provide 
credit services, such as trading and execution, clearance and custody, 
and financing services.50  These services are usually provided by banks 
or prime brokers and constitute an estimated multi-billion dollar 
industry.51 In return for extending credit to a particular fund, fund 
managers are required to provide collateral assets that can be liquidated 
in the event that the fund cannot cover its investment positions.52  
According to the GAO, hedge funds often provide collateral in the 
form of highly liquid securities or cash. Less often, funds will also 
provide collateral through lower rated or less liquid securities.53 By 
extending credit to a fund, the counterparty remains directly exposed to 
the risk of having the value of the fund’s collateral fall below the level 
needed to cover the fund’s liabilities should it become necessary.54 For 
this reason, the liquidity of the collateral and the degree to which these 
institutions have implemented sound risk management policies are 
significant factors in curtailing the potentially dangerous exposure to 
counterparty, and, by extension, systemic risk.55 Commonly referred to 
as “market discipline,”56 these constraints reside within each 
institution’s policies concerning margin and collateral requirements and 
 
14, 2006), available at http://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/key-information/speech-
speakers/tfgeithner/20060915-1.shtml (“Private pools of capital have the capacity to use 
extensive leverage to amplify returns.”).  
      49. Hedge Funds Oversight: Conclusion Report, TECHNICAL COMM’N OF THE INT’L ORG. 
OF SEC. COMM’NS 17 (Mar. 2009), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD288.pdf 
[hereinafter IOSCO Report] (this ratio fell to 1.4 times as of October 2008, however). 
      50.    Kambhu et al., supra note 36, at 3; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 27, at 7 (“[M]ost 
large hedge funds use multiple prime brokers as service providers. Thus, no one broker may have 
all the data necessary to assess the total leverage used by a hedge fund client.”). 
 51. See IMPLICATIONS, supra note 7, at viii. See also Bradley Keoun, Morgan Stanley 
Speculating to Brink of Collapse Got $107 Billion from Fed, BLOOMBERG.COM, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-22/morgan-stanley-at-brink-of-collapse-got-107b-
from-fed.html. 
 52. GAO REPORT, supra note 27, at 30. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Engert, supra note 4, at 340; see also Kambhu, supra note 36, at 3. 
 55. Geithner, supra note 48. 
 56. See GAO REPORT, supra note 27, at 26. Additionally, the adherence to the market 
discipline approach stems from the free market principles, which hold that private parties have the 
strongest “incentives to monitor counterparties as well as the best access to the information 
needed to do so effectively.” Nell Henderson, Fed Urges Banks to Monitor Hedge Funds, WASH. 
POST (May 17, 2006), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/05/16/AR2006051601745.html. 
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dictate the terms on which the counterparty will transact with a 
particular fund.57 
Although market discipline comprises the "first [and most 
important] line of defense between unregulated hedge funds and 
regulated financial institutions,” guarding against excessive risk-taking, 
a number of mitigating factors also influence this form of indirect 
regulation.58 First, in order for market discipline to be effective, 
counterparties must have access to information regarding the fund’s risk 
profile, as well as having the institutional mechanisms in place to limit 
the firm’s exposure to it.59 Traditionally, however, “the desire” for 
hedge funds to keep their market activities “confidential” can limit the 
flow of fund-specific information and has earned hedge funds a 
reputation for “opacity.”60  
Until the recent passage of the financial reform in the United 
States and the EU, hedge funds that fell under an exception to the 
existing securities laws have not been required by law to publicly 
disclose information relating to the activities of the fund.61 The extent to 
which some hedge funds receive their financing from multiple 
counterparties compounds this problem. By maintaining relationships 
with several parties, each individual creditor may be exposed to only a 
small proportion of the hedge fund’s overall position, which can affect 
that institution’s assessment of the risk.62 According to U.S. Treasury 
Secretary Timothy Geithner, “[t]his gives individual firms an incentive 
to free-ride on the due diligence or monitoring by others, which may 
render resultant collective discipline inadequate.”63 Moreover, market 
competition within the multi-billion dollar prime-brokerage industry 
helps ensure that the market standards are under constant downward 
pressure.64 Overall, because these inherent limitations can only be 
overcome by collective action, the burden of containing systemic risk 
must predominantly reside at the governmental level.65 
 
 57. See Kambhu, supra note 36, at 3–4. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bank, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta’s 2006 Financial Markets Conference: Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk (May 16, 2006), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20060516a.htm. 
 60. See Geithner, supra note 48. 
 61. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 33, at 351–55. 
 62. See Geithner, supra note 48. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See IMPLICATIONS, supra note 7, at 40. See also Keoun, supra note 51. 
 65. Engert, supra note 4, at 332. 
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B. The Relationship Between Hedge Fund Size and the Build-up of 
Systemic Risk 
In addition to the problem of free-riding, the sheer size of some of 
the largest hedge funds can present a systemic risk to the financial 
system. Although hedge funds only comprise an estimated 5 percent of 
all U.S. assets under management, they account for an estimated 30 
percent of all U.S. equity trading volume, as well as an estimated 40-
50% of the daily equity volume on major international markets.66 The 
primary consequence of this inverse ratio is that hedge funds can 
generate “externalities,” which can negatively impact not only those 
parties in privity with the fund, but also market participants with whom 
the fund shares no relationship.67 This problem primarily occurs in two 
ways. First, the problem occurs where a highly leveraged fund sustains 
a significant loss that negatively affects the creditor counterparty’s 
liquidity.68 This loss can impair the transacting party’s ability to provide 
financing to other market participants who depend on that lender’s 
capacity to extend credit.69 Second, and perhaps more importantly, some 
of the largest hedge funds have the ability to significantly alter market 
price movements due to their enormous size.70 
The International Organization of Securities Commissions notes 
that the ability for hedge funds to take concentrated positions in certain 
investments (compounded by the use of leverage) can “exacerbate” 
market volatility and lead to “disorderly asset pricing.”71 Here, losses 
sustained by a large fund may result in large sell-offs (“fire sales”) that 
can depress market prices, which, in turn, can cause other market 
participants to sustain significant losses.72 According to a 2008 GAO 
report on the hedge fund industry, “[i]f numerous market participants 
establish large positions on the same side of a trade, especially in 
combination with a high degree of leverage, this concentration can 
 
 66. Luis Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Hedge Fund Regulation on the Horizon – 
Don’t Shoot the Messenger (June 18, 2009) available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch061809laa.htm [hereinafter Aguilar]; see also Lewis, 
supra note 33, at 361. 
 67. Kambhu et al., supra note 36, at 11 (“An externality is the impact of one party’s action 
on others who are not directly involved in the transaction.”). 
 68. See id. at 7. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See id. at 11. 
 71. Geithner, supra note 48; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 27, at 35 (noting that the 
concentration of large positions on the same side of a trade can contribute to a liquidity crisis if 
traders are compelled to simultaneously unwind their positions).  
 72. See Engert, supra note 4, at 341–42. 
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contribute to a liquidity crisis if market conditions compel traders to 
simultaneously unwind their positions.”73 This problem is particularly 
apparent when this covariance involves short-selling. At the height of 
the credit crisis in September of 2008, for example, artificially negative 
price movements, largely the result of “naked” short-selling by 
institutional investors, helped facilitate the rapid deterioration of market 
conditions.74 This decline was so severe that the SEC took the 
extraordinary measure of issuing an emergency order prohibiting fund 
managers from engaging in the practice of “naked” short-selling.75 As 
this episode highlighted, in the absence of tighter regulatory controls, 
institutions may lack the incentive to “internalize” the effects of this 
unwinding on the market because fund managers have a greater 
incentive to minimize financial losses.76 Consequently, some observers 
have argued that the direct regulation of hedge funds should be enacted 
to limit the size of the hedge fund’s assets under management.77 
In addition to the systemic risks that some of the largest funds can 
present, the increasing number of hedge funds may also have a 
destabilizing effect on market pricing as fund positions become 
increasingly concentrated.78 Since Alfred Jones established the first 
hedge fund with one hundred thousand dollars in 1949, the number of 
hedge funds has grown exponentially, particularly since the 1990s.79 In 
1990, an estimated three hundred hedge funds managed a total of thirty-
nine billion dollars in combined assets.80 As of 2007, the number of 
hedge funds grew to an estimated ten thousand, with a total value of 
assets under management of $2.079 trillion.81 The industry’s remarkable 
 
 73. GAO REPORT, supra note 27, at 35. 
 74. Id. 
 75.  See Exchange Act Release No. 34-58592, at 2. 
 76. See Geithner, supra note 48; see also Kambhu et al., supra note 36, at 7 (“If a bank has a 
large exposure to a hedge fund that defaults or operates in markets where prices are falling 
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 77. See Frankel, supra note 21, at 659. 
 78. Tobias Adrian, Measuring Risk in the Hedge Fund Sector: Current Issues in Economics 
and Finance, 13 FED. RES. BANK 3, Mar.–Apr. 2007, at 1, 
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 79. Aguilar, supra note 66. 
 80. Daniel, supra note 11, at 253. 
 81. Oppold, supra note 19, at 840; KYLA MALCOLM, ET AL., IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED 
AIFM DIRECTIVE ACROSS EUROPE 15 (2009), 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/Impact_of_AIFM_Directive.pdf. At the time of writing, hedge 
fund assets under management totaled $1.917 trillion. Margot Patrick, Hedge-Fund Assets Hit 
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04590704576091872684789648.html. Ironically, as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act’s creation of 
  
2011] Containing Systemic Risk 249 
growth, however, has produced a growing body of evidence that 
suggests that greater levels of hedge fund “covariance” often precede 
higher levels of hedge fund volatility.82 This hedge fund covariance is 
primarily because continued growth of the industry may negatively 
impact a fund’s level of return as market positions become “saturated.”83 
As fund positions become concentrated in certain market areas, fund 
managers may decide to incorporate a greater degree of leverage into 
their investment strategies in order to provide a competitive rate of 
return.84 
IV.  THE CURRENT STATUS OF HEDGE FUND REGULATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The first half of this Note has provided both an overview of the 
defining characteristics of the term “hedge fund” and the inherent 
challenges that these funds present to the stability of the financial 
system. Focus will now shift to the most recent regulatory measures 
passed in both the United States and the EU as these reforms relate to 
the relationship between hedge funds and systemic risk. The following 
comparative analysis will consider the respective reforms in the 
following areas:  1) the aims and structure of each set of reforms; and, 
2) how effectively these reforms address the concerns over systemic 
risk.  
A.  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
1. The Dodd-Frank Act:  Aims and Background 
According to the preamble of the Dodd-Frank Act, the act is 
intended “[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by 
improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to 
end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending 
bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, 
and for other purposes.”85  
 
the Volker Rule, which bans proprietary trading on behalf of bank holding companies, the 
number of hedge funds, and presumably the amount of assets under management, is expected to 
increase as a greater number of former “prop traders” enter into the industry. Murray Coleman, 
Financial Reforms Expected to Boost Number of Hedge Funds, BARRON’S (Oct. 15, 2010, 2:38 
PM), http://blogs.barrons.com/focusonfunds/2010/10/15/financial-reforms-expected-to-boost 
number-of-hedge-funds/. 
 82. Adrian, supra note 78, at 6. 
 83. Schmidt, supra note 10, at 170. 
 84. Id.; see MALCOLM, supra note 81, at 85.   
 85. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
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The Dodd-Frank Act, which became effective on July 21, 2011, 
has been described as the most comprehensive financial reform 
legislation passed in the United States since the federal securities laws 
established in the 1930s.86 While the legislation itself is new, the act’s 
proscriptions are not.  
As it relates to hedge funds, the act builds upon the PWG’s 
recommendations set forth in the aftermath of the LTCM meltdown.87 In 
its 2007 final report entitled, “Principles and Guidelines Regarding 
Private Pools of Capital,” the PWG called for a principle-based 
regulatory approach that “affirms that ‘market discipline,’ supplemented 
by compliance with ‘industry sound practice,’ is the touchstone of 
hedge-fund regulatory policy.”88 Although the report stressed the need 
for greater transparency at the investor level, it did not specifically 
address the more important relationship between hedge funds and their 
trading counterparties.89 Moreover, the report’s integrity suffered from 
the fact that the implementation of its recommendations remained 
purely voluntary.90 
The Dodd-Frank Act’s call for hedge fund registration and 
increased disclosure can also trace its roots to the SEC’s short-lived 
“hedge fund rule” implemented in late 2004.91 Intended to eliminate the 
“Investment Advisor exemption,” the hedge fund rule modified the 
definition of a “client” under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
(IAA) by allowing regulators to “look through” the fund and count each 
investor as a “client” rather than only counting the fund itself.92 The 
latter system allowed fund managers to escape SEC registration by 
relying on the IAA’s exemption for advisors with less than fifteen 
clients.93 In a controversial 2006 opinion, the D.C. Circuit in Goldstein 
v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n struck down the existing rule on the grounds 
that the term “client” under the IAA only applied to the investment 
 
124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].  
 86. VIRAL V. ACHARYA, ET AL., REGULATING WALL STREET 359 (2010). 
 87. See PWG AGREEMENT, supra note 34, at 25 (noting that market discipline by creditors, 
counterparties, and investors is the most effective mechanism for limiting systemic risk from 
private pools of capital).  
 88. John P. Hunt, Hedge Fund Regulation: The President’s Working Group Committees’ 
Best Practices Reports – Raising the Bar but Missing Risks 5 (Berkeley Ctr. for Law, Bus. & the 
Econ., Working Paper, 2008) [hereinafter Hunt], available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1279870. 
 89. See id. at 9–10, 16; see also PWG AGREEMENT, supra note 34, at 32. 
 90. See Hunt, supra note 88, at 6. 
 91. Lewis, supra note 33, at 370.  
 92. Id. 
 93. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80B-3 (2012). 
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entity itself and not the number of actual investors in the fund.94 
Consequently, until Dodd-Frank was passed, hedge fund managers were 
not required to register with the SEC as long as they managed fewer 
than fifteen “entities.”95 
 More recently, the magnitude of the financial crisis helped forge 
a general consensus to increase disclosure as a necessary predicate for 
establishing a more stable financial system.96 As a result, with the aim 
of strengthening investor confidence, U.S. policy makers began the 
process of reforming the hedge fund industry by making fund manager 
activity more transparent at both the investor and counterparty levels.97 
It was clear from the beginning, however, that the market-based 
regulatory approach would remain as the cornerstone of U.S. regulatory 
policy and that the main focus would be on identifying the segment of 
funds that should be subject to greater regulatory oversight.98 In 
narrowing their focus, lawmakers rejected proposals to impose tighter 
restrictions on trade activity or to impose a tax on systemic risk—a clear 
manifestation of Congress’s desire to achieve a “balance” between the 
need for greater transparency and the desire to maintain U.S. 
preeminence within the industry.99 
2.  The Dodd-Frank Act:  Regulatory Approach 
In the United States, regulatory reforms related to the hedge fund 
industry are contained in Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act.100 According 
to Section 402 of Title IV, a hedge fund is essentially characterized as a 
“private fund” under the Investment Company Act of 1940.101 
Consequently, a hedge fund will now be considered an investment 
company that “is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or 
proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, 
or trading in securities.”102 Structurally, Title IV modifies the IAA by 
 
 94. Goldstein v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 451 F.3d 873, 882 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Capital Markets Regulatory Reform: Strengthening Investor Protection, Enhancing 
Oversight of Private Pools of Capital, and Creating a National Insurance Office: Hearing Before 
H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. 42 (2009) (statement of Stuart Kaswell, Executive 
Vice President, Managed Funds Association) [hereinafter Kaswell Statement]. 
 97. See Perspectives on Hedge Fund Registration: Hearing Before H. Subcommittee on 
Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, of the H. Committee on 
Financial Services, 111th Cong. 1–3 (2009). 
 98. See id. 
 99. See id. at 5–6. 
 100. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 401 et seq. 
 101. Id. § 402(b). 
 102. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A) (2004).  
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using the size of the fund’s assets under management as the determining 
factor regarding whether the fund manager will be required to register 
with the SEC.103 By implementing this “tiered” approach, the Dodd-
Frank Act reflects the industry’s prevailing view that only the largest 
hedge funds can present the types of systemic risk that the Act is 
intended to prevent.104 
3.  Addressing the Concerns Regarding Counterparty Risk and 
Disorderly Market Pricing 
The Dodd-Frank Act intends to mitigate counterparty risk by 
addressing hedge fund manager activity rather than directly regulating 
the fund itself.105 Central to the Act’s approach is the requirement that, 
for the first time, managers who oversee the largest hedge funds must 
register with the SEC.106 Section 408, however, specifies that hedge 
fund managers who act solely as an advisor to “private funds”107 will be 
subject to federal registration only if their assets under management 
exceed $150 million.108 Consequently, Section 408 will exclude 
approximately 82 percent of U.S. managed hedge funds from increased 
federal oversight.109 For those funds whose assets exceed the $150 
million threshold, the Act effectively eliminates the “private investment 
advisor exemption” in the IAA (and Goldstein opinion), which allowed 
funds to evade disclosure if the fund had less than fifteen “clients.”110 
By closing this regulatory loophole, Section 404 now requires these 
fund managers to provide information (using a revised Form ADV) to 
the SEC on an annual basis regarding:   
(A) the amount of assets under management and use of leverage, 
including off-balance-sheet leverage;  
(B) counterparty credit risk exposure;  
(C) trading and investment positions;  
 
 103. See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 401, 408. 
 104. See Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Opening Statement - 
SEC Open Meeting: Private Fund Systemic Risk Reporting (Jan. 25, 2011). 
 105. MARK JICKLING & KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41398, THE 
DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: TITLE VII, 
DERIVATIVES 2 (2010), available at www.llsdc.org/attachments/files/239/CRS-R41398.pdf. 
 106. See Dodd-Frank Act § 408. 
 107. Under § 402 of the Dodd-Frank Act, “private fund” is defined as “an issuer that would 
be an investment company under Section 3 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. § 
80a-3).” 
 108. Dodd-Frank Act § 408. In addition, § 410 of the Dodd-Frank Act raises the threshold for 
federal registration of all investment advisors from $25 million to $100 million. 
 109. See ACHARYA, supra note 86, at 359. 
 110. Investment Company Act § 80b-3(b)(3). 
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(D) valuation policies and practices of the fund;  
(E) types of assets held;  
(F) side arrangements [(side pocket agreements)] . . . ; [and]  
(G) [the fund’s] trading practices[.]111  
In addition, registration pursuant to the IAA requires the 
implementation of, among other things, a compliance program, an 
insider trading policy, and a code of ethics.112 
As a complement to Section 404’s informational requirements, the 
section also provides the SEC with the authority to require fund 
managers to provide additional information that the Commission may 
consider to be of public interest.113 Currently, the SEC is proposing that 
“large” hedge fund managers with over $1 billion in assets under 
management provide quarterly reports using a newly proposed reporting 
form (Form PF).114 As it stands, the rule would apply to an estimated 
two hundred funds, which, in the aggregate, manage about 80 percent of 
all hedge fund assets.115  
The prospect of forced disclosure was met with concerns from 
many fund managers over the confidentiality of the fund’s proprietary 
investment information.116 In particular, the ability to compile and 
disseminate asymmetrical information is a key component in 
maintaining a competitive advantage for those funds whose investment 
strategies rely upon the theory of market inefficiency.117 This is because 
these funds’ investment strategies are often predicated on exploiting 
market price discrepancies to secure short-term gains.118 Accordingly, 
public disclosure of this information would essentially neutralize the 
fund manager’s ability (and incentive) to realize gains using this type of 
investment approach. For this reason, Section 404 exempts “proprietary 
information” from public disclosure even though the SEC and the 
FSOC will review this information.119 
Disclosure will have an effect on the extent to which 
counterparties are willing to transact with a particular fund in addition 
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to its effects on fund managers from monetary costs associated with 
compliance.120 The most obvious advantage of Title IV’s approach is 
that this information can be used to make each fund’s market activity 
significantly more transparent, thereby allowing investors and 
counterparties to more accurately ascribe the fund’s level of risk. From 
this standpoint, mandatory disclosure is intended to protect other, more 
systemically important, market participants, such as prime brokerages 
(some of which were bailed out at the height of the credit crisis), by 
bolstering the effectiveness of market discipline.121 Of course, greater 
transparency will also have the added benefit of enhancing investor 
protection by preventing investment manager fraud.122  
While there is a tendency to view “smaller funds” as systemically 
non-important, Section 408 includes a provision for the registration of 
“mid-size” funds that do not meet the $150 million threshold.123 
Registration of these funds will not be automatic, however, and will 
only be required on an ad-hoc basis where the SEC determines that the 
fund may pose a systemic risk.124 Because Section 408 does not define a 
“mid-size” fund, the impact of Section 408 on this segment of the 
industry is not immediately clear. Moreover, the Act also does not 
specifically address smaller funds that may incorporate high leverage 
amounts.125 Currently, there remains the distinct possibility that this 
class of funds will be spared the burdens of increased disclosure.126 
Title IV’s focus on disclosure provides market participants with 
the information necessary to enhance market discipline while providing 
regulators with a better insight into the build-up of systemic risk within 
the financial system.127 Perhaps U.S. Deputy Secretary Neal Wolin 
stated it best when he remarked that, “to constrain systemic risk 
effectively, the Council [FSOC] and its members must be able to 
monitor systemic risk effectively.”128 In this way, disclosure helps 
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ensure that market regulators are not fighting yesterday’s battles. 
Because a large amount of the most important fund information will not 
be made public, however, the effectiveness of this approach as a 
regulatory instrument will likely be determined by the extent to which 
regulators are able to proficiently wield it.129  
Aside from its impact on transparency, it does not appear that Title 
IV will directly impact a fund’s ability to generate unwanted market 
externalities resulting from concentrated investment positions. To be 
sure, while stronger market discipline may reduce the extent to which 
the use of leverage can promote market concentration, the Act does not 
prohibit fund managers from engaging in high-risk strategies, nor does 
it impose any direct form of leverage restriction or liquidity 
requirements.130 At this time, the Act only instructs the SEC to conduct 
a study regarding the feasibility of requiring hedge funds to report, in 
real-time, their short-sale positions.131  
4.  The Role of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) 
What is surely one of the most significant, if not most 
controversial, means by which the Act addresses the build of systemic 
risk is through the creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC) under Section 111.132 The Act envisions the FSOC, which will 
be chaired by the U.S. Treasury Secretary and will include members of 
the Federal Reserve Board, will play a vital role in determining which 
market participants are systematically important enough to warrant 
increased federal oversight.133 The creation of the FSOC is an important 
step in containing the build-up of systemic risk because the FSOC can 
overcome the inherent collective action problem that can undermine the 
effectiveness of market discipline. Due to the potential for the 
disorderly unwinding of concentrated market positions under certain 
conditions, it may not be enough to know about a counterparty’s 
position vis-à-vis a particular fund.134 Consequently, the FSOC’s ability 
to compile information about the aggregate exposure of all market 
participants who may be forced to unwind their positions significantly 
enhances the traditional, market-based, regulatory system.  
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Undoubtedly, determining which hedge funds should be 
considered systemically important is complicated by the fact that hedge 
funds are heterogeneous; not all funds pursue the same strategy or 
operate in the same markets. Consequently, many hedge funds may not 
be systemically important at all.135 In considering which funds to deem 
systemically important, the FSOC proposes a comprehensive list of 
eleven “considerations” it will follow in identifying important funds to 
be subject to the FSOC’s supervision.136 These considerations include:  
“the extent of . . . leverage of the [fund][;]” the fund’s “off-balance-
sheet exposures[;]” the “interconnectedness” of the fund; and the fund’s 
relationships with other market participants.137  
Of course, the ability for the FSOC to oversee, and potentially 
intrude upon, fund manager activity under certain conditions is highly 
controversial.138 To some in the industry, the competitiveness of U.S. 
financial institutions “will, under this new structure, inevitably be 
subordinated to supervisory judgments about what these firms can 
safely be allowed to do.”139 There also remains the question of whether a 
fund that comes under the supervision of the FSOC will be allowed to 
fail.140 However, when construed against the other alternatives, namely, 
to exclude any form of final oversight, the creation of the FSOC 
represents the most effective option for providing a last line of defense 
absent more direct forms of regulation.141 Furthermore, at this time, the 
concerns surrounding the FSOC’s authority in this area may prove to be 
unfounded because it is unclear that the FSOC is even convinced that 
hedge funds can present a systemic risk.142  
While it is certainly difficult to make the argument that increased 
disclosure is a step in the wrong direction, there are some early 
indications that suggest that enhanced disclosure may entail some 
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unintended consequences. Most notably, the cost of complying with the 
new rules is predicted to be a major consideration in determining the 
economic viability of many smaller funds.143 Due to the predicted cost 
of compliance, many smaller funds that will be subject to registration 
may be forced to merge with larger funds that are generally viewed by 
investors as more stable.144 Moreover, there is also the fear that the 
continued consolidation of the industry will inspire “money managers[,] 
who might otherwise [establish] their own [funds],” to work for the 
larger, more established funds.145 Consequently, the act may have the 
effect of moving the industry in the direction of increasingly larger 
funds, which could present the same systemic problems that the 
legislation was intended to reduce.146 
 
B.  The Alternative Investment Fund Manager Directive (AIFMD) 
1.  The AIFMD:  Aims and Background 
In accordance with the European Union’s pre-existing regulatory 
regime, investment funds have been categorized as either UCITS or 
non-UCITS.147 The former includes pension and mutual funds that are 
available on the retail market and are strictly regulated under the UCITS 
Directive (85/611/EEC).148 The latter, also known as “alternative 
investment funds,” encompasses private equity and hedge funds—
which will now fall under the auspices of the AIFMD.149 Prior to the 
creation of the directive, the regulation of non-UCITS solely resided 
with the regulatory body of the fund’s home member-state.150 In fact, 
prior to the passage of the AIFMD, there was not a single European 
community law that specifically addressed hedge fund manager 
activity.151 As the financial crisis demonstrated, this patchwork 
regulation did not effectively manage the inherent cross-border risks 
associated with hedge fund activities. In its assessment of the key 
impacts of the AIFMD, the EU Commission Staff reported that, “the 
inability to piece together a comprehensive picture of AIFM leverage 
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and activities in all major European markets is a major flaw in existing 
systems[.]”152 As a result, the AIFMD was established independently for 
the specific purpose of regulating private pools of capital.153 According 
to the directive’s text, “the Directive aims at establishing a framework 
capable of addressing the potential risks that might arise from the 
activities of AIFMs and ensuring the effective monitoring of those risks 
by the competent authorities within the Union.”154 
Passed by the European Parliament and European Council in the 
fall of 2010, the AIFMD represents the most aggressive and 
comprehensive measure taken by the EU to establish unified standards 
for regulating hedge fund activity within the Union. Although, as 
recently as 2006 the European Commission conducted a study on the 
European hedge fund industry that called for regulators to further a 
policy of allowing fund managers to pursue a strategy of “enlightened 
self interest.”155 The initial draft of the current directive was notable for 
being far more extreme than its U.S. counterpart.156 The lack of an 
existing framework also made the drafting of the directive a 
painstakingly slow process that consumed over two years, largely 
because of member state disagreements over the scope of the proposed 
reforms.157 Most prominent among these disputes was the issue of the 
so-called European “passport,” which involved the question of whether 
a fund’s compliance with the provisions of the directive would allow 
that fund to solicit investors in all member states.158 
A number of influential members, particularly France and 
Germany, opposed the creation of a passport system, arguing that 
member states should be able to enact their own domestic regulations in 
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addition to those contained in the AIFMD.159 In the end, however, the 
reality of squandering an opportunity to reform this important 
industry—helped in no small part by the extensive lobbying efforts of 
the UK and the hedge fund industry—was too high a political cost, and 
the passport system prevailed.160 The AIFMD, however, has not been 
without its detractors. Indeed, one of the most prevalent critiques of this 
process is that regulators have placed “the cart before the horse” by not 
addressing more immediate systemic concerns, such as the size of large 
financial institutions, short selling, and the use of derivatives—areas 
that played a more visible role in the onset of the financial crisis.161  
2. The AIFMD:  Regulatory Approach 
The AIFMD prohibits fund managers from managing or marketing 
a hedge fund to professional investors in the EU unless the fund 
manager has been authorized in accordance with the terms of the 
directive.162 The primary advantage of this “passport” system is that 
authorized fund managers will be allowed to market and solicit funds in 
every member country without having to receive regulatory 
authorization on an individualized basis. According to Article 4 of the 
directive, hedge funds will be classified as “Alternative Investment 
Funds” (AIF), defined as any “collective investment . . . which raises 
capital from a number of investors, with a view to investing it in 
accordance with a defined investment policy” and is not authorized 
pursuant to Article 5 of the Directive 2009/65/EC.163 Like its U.S. 
counterpart, the AIFMD restricts investor access to hedge funds to only 
those individuals and institutions qualified as a “professional 
investor.”164  
Encompassing the so-called “passport” provision, Article 32 
provides that any EU authorized fund may market shares to professional 
investors in any member state.165 Correspondingly, hedge funds 
managed outside of the EU must comply with the provisions of the 
directive, in accordance with Article 39, in order to gain access to EU 
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community investors.166 In addition, the foreign fund must also ensure 
that arrangements are made to coordinate the flow of information 
between the regulatory authority of the fund’s home country and the 
appropriate authorities in the member state.167 Initially, the passport 
regime was the cause of much consternation in the United States due to 
the fear that U.S. managed funds would have to comply with the 
directive or else risk being locked out of the European market.168 
However, this fear appears to have dissipated recently as it is widely 
suspected that the directive will consider the U.S. regulatory 
requirements to satisfy the directive’s prerequisites.169 Ironically, for 
reasons discussed below, it may now be less expensive for U.S. based 
hedge funds to solicit funds from investors in member states than it is 
for union countries. 
Currently, the implementation of the AIFMD is planned to consist 
of at least three phases.170 Phase One covers the authorization of, and the 
operating conditions for, the AIFM Directive.171 The second phase will 
establish provisions regarding “depository requirements.”172 The third, 
phase will address provisions relating to transparency requirements and 
the use of leverage.173 At the time of writing, however, only Phase One 
has been passed with the subsequent phases to be drafted and voted on 
in the coming months. Consequently, although the basic regulatory 
framework is now in place, the detail of the directive’s provisions will 
become more apparent in the months ahead.  
Structurally, the AIFMD, like the Dodd-Frank Act, targets the 
investment manager rather than the fund itself.174 Moreover, the size of 
the fund’s assets under management is also the determining factor in 
classifying which funds will be subject to the directive’s 
requirements.175 In accordance with Article 3, two classes of hedge fund 
managers will now be subject to heightened regulatory scrutiny.176 The 
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first class will be comprised of those fund managers using leverage with 
over €100 million in assets under management.177 The second class will 
broadly consist of managers with total assets of over €500 million, 
regardless of the use of leverage.178 By triggering registration at a lower 
figure for those funds using leverage, Article 3 directly addresses a 
category of funds that Dodd-Frank does not—smaller funds that 
incorporate significant amounts of leverage into their investment 
portfolios.179 For those funds that do meet the Directive’s threshold, 
Article 6 still requires the fund manager to register with the regulatory 
authority of their home Member State.180 These smaller funds, however, 
may “opt-in” under Article 32 to avail themselves of access to 
professional investors in other union member states.181 Under the 
AIFMD, member states will have two years to establish the domestic 
legislation necessary to implement the Directive before it becomes 
effective in January 2013.182 After that date, fund managers will have up 
to one year to comply with the Directive’s requirements.183 For those 
funds managed outside of the EU, the wait will be considerably longer 
because the directive will not become effective until 2015.184  
3.  The AIFMD:  Addressing the Concerns Regarding Counterparty 
Risk and Disorderly Market Pricing 
The most salient feature of the AIFMD is the transfer of national 
regulatory control over alternative investments to EU standards, at least 
with respect to systemically important funds. While the Directive 
establishes trans-national standards, the primary responsibility for 
ensuring fund manager compliance with the Directive will reside not 
with EU authorities but with regulators in the fund’s home member 
state.185 The European Securities and Markets Agency (ESMA), the 
financial regulatory authority of the EU, will retain primary 
responsibility for regulating foreign hedge funds and may coordinate 
with member states to establish protective measures for member-state 
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funds.186 
Although the AIFMD and the Dodd-Frank Act promote fund 
manager disclosure as the cornerstone of their respective frameworks, it 
is clear that regulators under the AIFMD will retain a significantly 
greater degree of direct regulatory control over fund manager activity 
than those in the United States. Specifically, the AIFMD addresses the 
relationship between hedge fund activity and systemic risk in two ways. 
First, Chapter IV of the Directive requires fund managers to make 
comprehensive disclosures to both investors and to the regulatory body 
of home member state.187 Second, Chapter V of the Directive grants 
both the member state and the ESMA the power to monitor, and even 
limit, the degree to which fund managers may incorporate leverage.188  
Like the Dodd-Frank Act, the most salient feature of the AIFMD is 
the degree to which fund managers will be required to disclose their 
investment activities. Once the Directive becomes effective, fund 
managers will be required to submit annual reports to investors 
disclosing, among other things:  a current balance sheet, the fund’s 
investment strategy, and the circumstances in which the fund may 
incorporate leverage into its investment strategy.189 Under Article 24, 
fund managers will also be required to provide a more detailed annual 
report to regulators in the fund’s home member state.190 Specifically, the 
report must include information regarding the instruments and markets 
in which the fund is invested, the main categories of assets in which the 
fund is invested, and the percentage of the fund’s illiquid assets.191 In 
addition, the Directive takes the remarkable step of requiring each fund 
manager to establish a maximum level of leverage that the fund may 
incorporate into its strategy.192 
The Directive’s disclosure requirements seek to limit systemic risk 
in two important ways. First, as discussed above, disclosure enhances 
market discipline by providing counterparties and other market 
participants with the information necessary to implement effective risk 
management policies. In doing so, the Directive, like the Dodd-Frank 
Act, aims to protect other systemically important institutions that 
maintain relationships with hedge funds by enhancing market discipline. 
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Of course, the degree to which the Directive’s disclosure requirements 
will enhance market discipline depends in large part on the actions of 
individual counterparties, as well as future industry reforms aimed at the 
fund-creditor relationship.  
Second, the Directive also addresses the problem of systemic risk 
by providing regulators in both the home Member State and the ESMA 
with detailed fund information that can help these authorities identify 
the extent to which the fund’s use of leverage contributes to the build up 
of systemic risk.193 According to one analysis of the directive’s impact, 
although there is no clear evidence that proves that disclosure of the 
fund’s use of leverage to investors reduces systemic risk, such 
disclosure is “necessary in order to improve macro-prudential 
oversight.”194 As mentioned earlier, the extent to which regulators under 
the AIFMD can exercise direct control over fund manager activity 
represents the most significant divergence with the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Nowhere is this departure more apparent than in the enormous power 
granted to the regulatory authorities of the fund’s home member state 
under Article 7. Specifically, the Article provides individual state 
regulators with the authority to restrict the scope of the fund manager’s 
authorization by placing limitations directly on the fund’s investment 
strategy.195 
4.  The Role of European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 
So what happens in the event that regulators determine that a 
hedge fund presents an unacceptable systemic risk? Article 25 provides 
that home-State regulators, under advisement with the ESMA and the 
newly created European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), can restrict the 
fund’s use of leverage as well as place “restrictions” on the management 
of the fund.196 Moreover, the ability for regulators to restrict the use of 
leverage is not necessarily fund-specific, as restrictions can be placed on 
particular groups of funds.197 Similarly, Article 45 affords ESMA with 
the power not only to prohibit the marketing of non-member funds 
within the union, but also to impose restrictions on non-member fund 
managers where their activities are believed to present a systemic or 
counterparty risk.198 In this way, the role of the ESMA as a fund 
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overseer may be much like the Financial Services Oversight Committee 
in the United States.199  
A closer inspection of Article 45 reveals that home-State 
regulators, under Article 25, will have broader authority to impose 
restrictions than the EU-level ESMA. This is because Article 45 
delineates the particular circumstances that will trigger the exercise of 
the ESMA’s authority. Specifically, the ESMA may take action where a 
“substantial threat” exists with respect to the cross-border financial 
system and where home-State authorities have not taken sufficient 
measures to address the threat.200 The scope of the ESMA’s authority to 
act, however, is severely limited under the same Article because of the 
mandate that the organization’s actions must not create the risk of 
regulatory arbitrage or hamper the efficiency of the financial markets in 
a disproportionate manner.201 Consequently, the narrow parameters in 
which the ESMA may act could have a chilling effect on the 
organization’s incentive to take immediate action. Furthermore, the 
Directive does not provide an explanation of what a “substantial threat” 
constitutes, making it unclear whether such a threat would relate solely 
to the build-up of systemic risk or threats to other areas of the market in 
which the fund does not transact. 
The effectiveness of the Directive’s ability to constrain systemic 
risk will significantly depend on a number of variables, not the least of 
which will include the ability of home-State authorities and the ESMA 
to seamlessly cooperate, as well as the timeliness of imposing leverage 
restrictions. As to the former, although Article 48 of the Directive 
obligates home-State authorities and the ESMA to cooperate, the 
Directive conspicuously fails to provide the ESMA with final decision-
making authority.202 In the event of a disagreement between these 
parties, the Directive will instead require ESMA mediation.203 Of 
course, while the likelihood of a significant disagreement may 
ultimately be non-existent, the European Union’s ongoing solvency 
problems have demonstrated that collective action amongst Member 
States is not necessarily a given when it comes to economic policy 
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matters.204 Furthermore, the lack of overriding decision-making 
authority could also mean that coordination in times of crisis could be 
dangerously slow. 
Regarding the latter, according to one impact assessment, the 
ability for regulators to restrict the use of leverage in extraordinary 
circumstances may not even address the actual build-up of systemic 
risk.205 In fact, one of the most prevalent concerns regarding the use of 
leverage restrictions is that the limitations themselves may actually 
intensify the ability for hedge funds to generate externalities.206 
According to the same study, the imposition of leverage restrictions will 
likely result in an environment in which fund managers will operate 
close to the designated leverage limitations.207 Consequently, in the 
event that market conditions deteriorate, these funds may be forced to 
sell assets “beyond what might be necessary from the perspective of 
retaining sufficient collateral with brokers” to stay within the leverage 
limitations.208 Another inherent limitation on the Directive’s impact is 
the modest size of the European hedge fund industry itself. As of late 
2009, only 5 percent of the global hedge fund industry was based in the 
EU, with only an estimated 26 percent of all hedge fund assets managed 
within the European community.209 Thus, the effectiveness of actions 
taken by the relevant European authorities may be quite limited where 
the conditions giving rise to financial instability reside outside of the 
EU.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
So, have the United States and the EU fallen out of step on hedge 
fund reform? Although this remained a distinct possibility in early 2010, 
the final legislation passed on both sides of the Atlantic shows that the 
two sides have largely ended up in the same place. In being the first 
member of the G-20 to pass financial reform in this area, U.S. policy 
makers hoped that the Dodd-Frank Act would provide the model the 
rest of world would adopt.210 Thus far, however, this goal has failed to 
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materialize. Both sides have rightly decided to make disclosure the 
centerpiece of their respective reform agendas without implementing 
measures that will make compliance too onerous from a competitive 
standpoint.211 The financial reforms adopted by the United States and 
the EU do show that differences remain, however. Without question, 
fund managers in the EU will face a greater level of regulatory scrutiny 
than their American competitors. By contrast, in the United States, there 
still remains the question of what form the FSOC will take, if one will 
ever take form at all. What is sure is that even with these reforms in 
place the global hedge fund industry will likely consolidate, albeit while 
continuing to grow. Amidst all this uncertainty, only time will reveal the 
true measure of whether policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic 
have achieved their goals of implementing a more stable industry—or, 
conversely, whether these recent reforms will have planted the seeds 
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